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Exploring Three Correlates of Thought Suppression: 
Attention, Absorption, and Cognitive Load 
Carolyn I. Vicchiullo and Dana S. Dunn 
Moravian College 
Previous studies evaluating the probability of successful thought suppression (attempts to rid our minds 
of repeated unwanted thoughts) have relied solely upon internal mental distracters (Wegner, 1989), 
characterizing thought suppression to be a controlled rather than an automatic process. As an alternative 
approach, the effects of attention actively focused on limited external stimuli were studied in order to 
achieve easy, effortless, and successful thought suppression. Participants included students enrolled in 
undergraduate psychology courses. Experiment 1 showed that the presence of cognitive load 
(computerized tests of perceptual skills) occupied conscious capacity sufficiently so that attempts to 
suppress both mundane (tree) and exciting (sex) target thoughts were successful. Experiment 2 revealed 
that the physiological effects of exciting thoughts (measured via electrodermal activity) were higher for 
participants who were rated as having a predisposition toward successful suppression, although contrary 
to the results of Experiment 1, cognitive load did not have any effect on suppression or expression of 
target thoughts. Experiment 3 found that the type of cognitive load (motoric or attentional) was a factor in 
achieving successful thought suppression. Collectively, these findings suggest that experience seems to 
be a more effective thought distracter relative to traditional internal mental distracters, but only when 
attention is captured involuntarily and by an appropriately challenging level of cognitive load. 
Experience tells us that trying to willfully 
eliminate an unwanted thought from our minds is an 
almost impossible task. Try as we might to command 
our thoughts to obey our wishes, there always seems to 
be a mysterious mental force which we encounter that 
sooner or later obstructs virtually every effort to 
suppress a particular unwanted thought. There are 
probably few of us who can triumph over the 
compelling force of our mind as we helplessly ruminate 
about an especially exciting event (the purchase of a 
ticket to win the $50 million lottery) or an imminent 
catastrophe (the fact that the winning ticket was lost!). 
Indeed, research dealing with intentional and 
internal mind control in this sense has led to the 
conclusion that successful thought suppression is not 
only difficult (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 
1987), but also quite futile (Wegner & Erber, 1992). In 
fact, the notion of incomplete thought suppression is 
so widely accepted that investigation has centered 
around its consequences (Wegner & Erber, 1993; 
Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, Shorn, Blake & Page, 
1990;) and characteristics (Wegner & Erber, 1992; 
Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein, 1991; Wenzloff, Wegner & 
Roper, 1988) rather than on uncovering alternative 
methods of achieving successful elimination of 
unwanted thoughts. 
Therefore, the intention of this investigation was 
to use the obstacles presented in thought suppression 
research thus far as a point of departure for an alternate 
approach to the dilemma of unwanted thoughts. 
Drawing upon Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 1990) theory 
of optimal experience as a model, suppression's 
counterpart, concentration, was considered to be a 
viable avenue for exploration. Thus, a synthesis 
between these two theories was proposed to replace the 
traditional mind control suppression model, and it was 
predicted that participants who were involved in a 
totally cognitively-absorbing experiential activity 
would find thought suppression to be (a) easy, (b) 
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effortless (consequential, such that all irrelevant 
material would naturally be unavailable to conscious 
awareness), and (c) successful. 
Experiment 1 studied the effect that the absence or 
presence of cognitive load (computerized tests of 
perceptual skills) exerts on attempts to suppress 
mundane (tree) or exciting (sex) target thoughts. 
Results confirmed that concentration overwhelmingly 
promoted successful thought suppression. However, 
there were far more mundane thought occurrences 
recorded relative to exciting thoughts. Experiment 2 
therefore addressed the unanticipated result of the first 
study. First, following Wegner et al. (1990), the 
physiological effects of suppression were measured. 
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded to clarify 
whether exciting target thoughts might be 
nonconsciously affecting the sympathetic nervous 
system—even though conscious exciting thought 
intrusions were not occurring as often as predicted. A 
mirror-tracing task provided three incrementally difficult 
levels of mental load. Data indicated that mundane 
thoughts were associated with lower EDA activity 
versus exciting ones, replicating the results found by 
Wegner et al. (1990). This time, however, cognitive 
load did not significantly promote thought suppression. 
In addition, the absorption ability of participants 
was evaluated using the Tellegen Absorption Scale 
(TAS) in order to determine the possibility of a 
predisposition for successful thought suppression 
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Although there can be 
many definitions of this personality trait, absorption is 
characterized here as an openness to experience 
identified by the simultaneous integration and 
dissociation with task-relevant and -irrelevant stimuli, 
respectively (Tellegen & Atkinson). 
Since the mental load used in Experiment 2 was 
motoric and suppression was unsuccessful, it was 
suspected that motoric task as mental load was not 
sufficiently attentional and challenging in nature to 
produce successful suppression (M. D'Iorio, personal 
communication, March 21, 1995; Davidson, Schwartz, 
& Rothman, 1976). Consequently, Experiment 3 
examined the possibility that the type of mental load 
under which a participant was placed was critically 
important to the validity of the focused attention 
hypothesis. However, first it is necessary to understand 
thought suppression as a mechanism of deliberate 
mental control. 
The Problem of Mind Control 
It seems logical to assume that in order to suppress 
an unwanted thought, all one has to do is consciously 
think of something else. In support of this belief,  
studies have shown • that when asked to suppress a 
certain thought, people verbalizing their streams of 
consciousness enumerate a litany of unrelated items 
designed to direct their attention away from the 
unwanted object (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987). However, 
according to Wegner et al. (1987), such unfocused self-
distraction, though instinctively employed by subjects, 
rendered successful suppression a difficult, even 
unreachable goal. Repetitive cyclic thought sequences 
consistently brought participants back to the unwanted 
thought thereby refueling the search for new distracters 
(Wegner et al., 1987). In addition, those stimuli used as 
distracters (e.g., thoughts of inanimate objects, people, 
places, etc.), as well as the environment in which the 
suppression took place, began to take on the property 
of the unwanted thoughts. These internal and external 
cues were found to eventually act as reminders of the 
original unwanted thought (Wegner, Schneider, 
Knutson & McMahon, 1991). These findings suggested 
that sooner or later effective distracters would disappear. 
Introduction of an assigned single distracter improved 
the ability to suppress (Wegner et al., 1987, 
Experiment 2; Wegner et al., 1990), but it became 
obvious that even given suitable distracters, strong 
attentional powers would be essential if suppression 
were to be more successful (Wegner & Schneider, 
1989). Taken together, previous studies suggest that 
thought suppression as a mechanism of deliberate 
mental control and thought redirection is likely to be 
both difficult and unsuccessful. 
A Holistic Approach to Consciousness 
and Attention 
In early times, eagerness to adhere to scientific 
methods prompted structuralists (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt 
and Edward Titchener) and functionalists (e.g., William 
James) to view consciousness through a reductionistic 
lens. Recognition of a concept occurred only to the 
extent that its elemental neurophysiological 
components were understood. Attempts to explain 
consciousness were based on "hard-evidence" answers to 
empirical questions designed to deal with consciousness 
on a basic sensory level. 
More recently, Csikszentmihalyi (1978, 1990) 
introduced the idea that consciousness was best 
perceived as a holistic experiential phenomenon. 
Csikszentmihalyi considers the person to be a self-
governing, goal-directed system. Because the idea of 
consciousness includes consideration of external stimuli 
as well as an awareness of inner states, consciousness 
is represented as an integration of human experience and 
action. 
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Central to Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 1990) theory 
is the fact that attention is perceived as a process that 
concerns the whole person interacting with the 
environment. It is seen as the psychic energy (albeit 
limited) that is necessary to control the stream of 
consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Glass, 
Holyoak & Santa, 1979). Attention can only be given 
to a certain number of features in the environment. 
Thus, when the mind is fully focused, any stimuli not 
occupying the focal area are left unrecognized and 
unprocessed (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Csikszentmihalyi (1978, 1990) extended these 
observations to develop his theory of optimal or "flow" 
experience. He believes that attention intensely focused 
on a limited stimulus field leads to the exclusion of all 
other material. A state of happiness, peak performance, 
and a loss of self-consciousness derives from this 
experiential event, all of which contributes to the total 
absorption in the episode. According to 
Csikszentmihalyi, such experiences must be 
subjectively engrossing to an individual in order to 
provide such fascination. Listening to music, writing, 
mountain climbing, even watching a movie might 
initiate the likelihood for an optimal experience. In 
addition, once people become involved in a task that is 
enjoyable or that challenges their skills to such a level 
at which mastery is possible (with the appropriate 
effort), a unique consequence ensues: all other 
unpleasant or unwanted mental material is forgotten 
while the participant is involved in this state of intense 
focused attention. 
In this experiential context, mental control could 
be possible and even effective. If we followed William 
James' advice and exercised our will to focus attention 
selectively, only those stimuli that would capture 
attention appropriately would have effective influence 
on specific intentions (Wegner & Erber, 1993). Indeed, 
this combination of consciousness and will should be 
particularly effective when trying to suppress an 
unwanted thought. 
Experience as a Thought Distracter 
Attention is the mechanism that is responsible for 
selecting the particular information that will enter 
consciousness. It is influenced by complex mental 
operations (e.g., retrieval of memory, comparison, 
deciding on a course of action) which compete for a part 
of its energy, resulting in limited processing capacity 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1978). During a state of optimal 
experience, attention is required to be fully and 
intensely focused on a narrow stimulus field. It is  
therefore possible that the cognitive energy necessary to 
fuel the completion of a particular experiential task will 
consume the balance of available attentional capacity. 
As a result, all extraneous stimuli will automatically 
be cut off from awareness—in short, simply forgotten 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). This phenomenon is 
supported by self-reports of individuals who, while 
engaged in a state of flow, claimed that they were able 
to effortlessly forget even the unpleasant aspects of life 
when in this condition (Csikszentmihalyi, 1978). 
Moreover, this state of flow is compatible with the 
concept that cognitive load—especially cognitive 
overload (Wegner & Erber, 1993)—results in automatic 
and therefore consequential thought suppression. 
Attention and experience are thus related in that optimal 
experience requires concentration. 
Recall that the primary purpose of a thought 
distracter is to redirect attention away from an unwanted 
thought. In light of the previous information regarding 
the state of flow, experience would seem to be an ideal 
thought distracter. If external distracters (experientially 
absorbing activities) replace internal distracters 
(thoughts of irrelevant information necessary for the 
operation of the intentional mental control paradigm), 
relatively effortless and successful thought suppression 
should then result. 
Finally, experience as a thought distracter has two 
additional advantages. First, it has the benefit of not 
becoming a reminder of the original unwanted thought 
(cf. Wegner, 1989; Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner & 
Erber, 1992). A complete break from any associations 
linked with the unwanted thought would be 
accomplished. Total emersion in an activity 
challenging ones skills should break the connection 
with forbidden thoughts or any thoughts not connected 
with the actual activity. Second, as a thought distracter, 
experience completely fills up conscious capacity; there 
is no room for anything else (Csikszentmihalyi, 1978, 
1990). Compared to mind control which requires 
intentionality and effort of thought redirection on a 
metacognitive level, optimal experience bypasses 'that 
process automatically eliminating unwanted thoughts. 
In short, since a review of the existing literature on 
thought suppression revealed unsuccessful attempts at 
attaining this goal, an alternative method of achieving 
successful suppression was suggested and an 
experiential model of suppression was proposed. To. 
that end, the following study tests the tentative 
conclusion that under conditions of intense cognitive 
load, thought suppression would be easily and 
effortlessly achieved.- 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Design and Overview. The effects of 
concentration on thought suppression were examined. 
Specifically, the purpose of this study was to 
investigate whether an experiential distracter would be 
more effective in achieving successful thought 
suppression than traditional internal mental distracters. 
Thus, it was predicted that if conscious capacity was 
intensely involved in a cognitively-absorbing 
experiential activity, intrusions of target thoughts 
would be successfully eliminated. Automatic exclusion 
of peripheral stimuli would allow successful 
suppression to occur with relatively little or no effort. 
Because of the relatively subjective and experiential 
nature of this theory, bringing the investigation into 
the laboratory for examination presented a challenge. 
Typically, most data concerning experiential studies 
have been collected via the experiential sampling 
method (Csikszentmihalyi 1978, 1990) in which 
participants were randomly interrupted during their day 
to self-report their thoughts. However, a more scientific 
method of data collection was sought here in order to 
yield results that were as reliable as possible. 
The objective was to simulate an intrinsically 
motivated activity and subjective experience by 
manipulation of extrinsic variables. It was decided that 
conditions of cognitive load would closely resemble the 
self-absorbing task necessary to mimic real-life 
concentration. Also, a slight incentive was employed to 
compel participants to put as much effort into the tasks 
as was objectively possible. 
Two levels of thought (mundane and exciting) were 
used in order to test the strength of the focused 
attention paradigm. The choice of sex as an exciting 
thought was based on results of a study conducted by 
Wegner et al. (1990) in which the thought of sex was 
shown to produce the highest level of 
psychophysiological reactivity as compared to several 
less exciting thoughts (e.g., dancing, subjects' mothers, 
and the Dean). For purposes of this study, that effect 
was generalized to include the possibility that sex as an 
exciting thought would also account for the highest 
number of thought occurrences among participants and 
so would consequently be the most difficult to 
suppress. 
Participants. Forty-one undergraduates (11 
males, 30 females) from introductory and upper-level 
psychology classes at Moravian College, Bethlehem, 
PA, volunteered to participate in the study in return for 
extra credit. The mean age of participants was 24.93 
(SD = 9.57). The participant pool in all experiments  
was considered to be a good enough representative 
sample of the college population necessary for the 
purposes of these studies. Many of the volunteers were 
enrolled in both day and evening courses. Typically, it 
was not surprising to find the students enrolled in the 
evening courses to be middle-aged or older in some 
cases. It was therefore hoped that this variation in age 
would allow for a diverse set of responses across 
participants. None of the participants in this study were 
interviewed for Experiment 2 or 3. Because one male 
participant misunderstood the instructions and 
considered every thought that entered his mind as one to 
be counted, his data were discarded. Consequently, a 
total of 40 participants' data were analyzed in the study. 
Suppression and Load Manipulations. 
Participants arrived and were interviewed individually in 
separate rooms. This precaution was taken to insure 
that participants were not influenced by the responses 
of other participants. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions in which they were instructed to suppress 
either an exciting thought (sex) or a mundane thought 
(tree). Within each of these conditions, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two levels of 
cognitive load. Thought targets and thought 
instructions were counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants in the no-load condition were merely asked 
to suppress the exciting or mundane thought simply by 
using any mental distraction technique they 
subjectively chose. They were left to their own devices 
to create a diversion that would prohibit the entrance of 
the unwanted target thought into consciousness. In 
addition, they were instructed to close their eyes so that 
the main external stimuli available would be of an 
auditory or tactile nature (following Knutson & 
Lansing, 1990). Participants were asked to perform 
their specific assignments for a period of 10 minutes. 
After the instructions were given, the experimenter left 
the room, returning only to collect the results, debrief 
the participants, and to thank them for their 
participation in the study. 
Participants in the cognitive load condition were 
also asked to suppress either an exciting or a mundane 
thought; however, these participants were also told that 
their perceptual abilities would be tested. Each was 
placed in front of a computer terminal and required to 
perform cognitive tasks assessing perceptual skills by 
following instructions that were integrated into a 
software package. The programmed experiments 
consisted of four tests based on a combination of 
elements including psychophysics (method of constant 
stimuli and signal detection), feature detection (pattern 
recognition) and information processing (comparing 
visual and semantic information). In order to create 
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additional motivation for the participants to become as 
absorbed as possible in the tasks, each was told that the 
other participants had no trouble in completing the 
tasks in the 10 minute time period, and that their scores 
would be compared with the scores of others who had 
taken the tests. In actuality these tasks would take well 
over the 10 minute time period to complete, but these 
incentives were deemed necessary to insure motivation 
to perform a cognitively-absorbing assignment in a 
laboratory setting. 
Volunteers were told that the results of the tasks 
would be tabulated at the end of each section so that the 
experimenter was not required to be present; but in 
reality, participant performance was not recorded. 
Participants were also informed that the software had 
the capability to record their scores so they were not to 
stop to record their own scores when they finished a 
particular segment of the experiment. Since the 
instructions in the program were self-explanatory, 
participants were told to use their best judgment if they 
encountered difficulty during the test period. At the end 
of the 10 minute time period, the experimenter returned 
to collect the results, debrief the participants, and thank 
them for their participation in the experiment. 
Dependent Measures. In all conditions, 
participants were provided with paper and pencil, and 
requested to place a check mark on the paper whenever 
they experienced awareness of their target thought 
breaking into consciousness. It was reasoned that 
because the no-load participants had their eyes closed 
and could not see the paper and pencil, these items 
would not be taken as cues associated with the 
unwanted thought. Similarly, because the .cognitive 
load participants were visually fixated on the computer 
monitor, it was not expected that the paper and pencil 
would remind them of the unwanted thought. 
Materials. Software, "Computer Lab for 
Memory and Cognition," used for the cognitive load 
condition was provided by Conduit-Laboratory in 
Cognition and Perceptions, The University of Iowa, 
Oakdale Campus, Iowa City, IA, 52242; Applesoft in 
ROM, 48K DOS 3. 
Results 
Since there were no statistically significant gender 
differences, F < 1.00, p > .05, this variable will not be 
discussed further. However, successful thought 
suppression was indeed impressive, as the total number 
of exciting and mundane thought occurrences 
significantly decreased from 194 in the no-load 
condition to 29 in the load condition (see Table 1). 
A 2 (high vs. low cognitive load) x 2 (mundane 
vs. exciting target thought) analysis of variance  
(ANOVA) was conducted on thought occurrences. A 
significant main effect for thought targets was found, 
F(1,36) = 14.12, p < .0009. Unexpectedly, mundane 
thoughts (M = 15.80) were found to occur more 
frequently than exciting thoughts (M = 3.60). As 
predicted, a main effect for cognitive load was also 
found to be significant, F(1,36) = 26.26. p < .0001. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants in the load 
condition experienced far fewer thought occurrences (M 
= 1.04) relative to those in the no-load condition (M = 
9.07). Moreover, a significant interaction between 
thought target and cognitive load qualified both main 
effects, F(1,36) = 14.60, p < .0008. Thought targets 
interacted with cognitive load such that participants 
assigned to the exciting thought and mundane thought 
conditions experienced far fewer thought occurrences 
when involved in a cognitively absorbing task. 
However, a more substantial reduction in thought 
occurrences was evident in the mundane thought-
cognitive load condition relative to the exciting 
thought-cognitive load condition. 
Discussion 
Results of this study present compelling evidence 
that concentration positively facilitates suppression: 
Only 13% of all thought occurrences took place in the 
load condition relative to 86% in the no-load condition. 
The prediction that the number of thought occurrences 
in the no-load condition would be greater than the 
number of thought occurrences in the load condition 
was so clearly demonstrated that it may be concluded 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Thought 
Occurrences as a Function of Cognitive Load 
Condition n Thoughts M SD 
No-Load 
Exciting Thoughts 10 36 3.60 2.67 
Mundane Thoughts 10 158 15.80 9.41 
Cognitive Load 
Exciting Thoughts 10 15 1.50 1.65 
Mundane Thoughts 10 14 1.40 2.27 
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was so clearly demonstrated that it may be concluded 
that thought suppression is unsuccessful when internal 
mental distracters are used as the singular method of 
mind control. At best, this technique seems to be 
effective in keeping an unwanted thought at bay only 
temporarily—as any number of internal distraction 
strategies eventually fail to keep the target thought 
totally out of awareness (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner 
• et al., 1990; Wegner et al., 1991; Wegner & Schneider, 
1989). When compared to a conscious effort to use 
specific internal thought distracters, the experiential 
model appears to be far more successful. 
To further understand the effects of concentration 
on suppression, participants who experienced 
occurrences of the target thoughts in the load condition 
were questioned about the circumstances under which 
these thoughts became conscious. Of the 29 total 
reported thoughts in the load condition, 13 thoughts 
entered participants' awareness while the . -computer 
tabulated scores and progressed to the next test. 
Presumably, cognitive absorption was relaxed 
sufficiently during these intermissions so that 
participant's minds were not fully engaged on the 
narrow stimulus field. This cognitive relaxation 
allowed the target thought to creep back into 
consciousness, causing suppression to fail. Even more 
noteworthy was the fact that of the 20 participants 
assigned to the load condition, 10 reported having no 
target thoughts whatsoever during the 10 minute 
period. Consideration of these supplemental facts lend 
even more credibility to the experiential model of 
thought 	 suppression. 
	
Thus, 	 concentration 
overwhelmingly promoted successful thought 
suppression. 
Suppression Explained by Capacity 
Models of Attention. Why were the occurrences of 
unwanted thoughts in the load condition so 
significantly decreased? Two possibilities may be 
considered. The first is Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 
1990) model of optimal experience (flow). 
Csikszentmihalyi contends that in this state of flow, 
consciousness only attends to the required amount of 
stimuli necessary to carry out a particular activity. 
Consequently, once attention is completely absorbed, 
we are virtually unaware of anything else around us. 
Further, Csikszentmihalyi maintains that when the 
mind is fully engaged in an enjoyable or challenging 
task, information irrelevant to the immediate objective 
is simply left unprocessed. If the findings of this 
current study are interpreted Csikszentmihalyi's terms, 
it would seem that suppression is a natural consequence 
of focused attention on a limited stimulus field. There 
is no effort needed to redirect thoughts away from an 
unwanted idea. As attention becomes focused on a fully  
absorbing stimulus,. the state of consciousness is 
altered. Controlled processes, which are normally 
implemented by the mind on a voluntary and 
intentional basis, are rendered worthless. Becoming 
engaged in the task at hand involuntarily blocks 
irrelevant stimuli from awareness causing successful 
thought suppression occur automatically. 
The second interpretation may be understood by 
means of Kahneman's (1973) capacity model for 
attention in selective attention tasks. Kahneman argues 
that the subjective demands of a task on a person are a 
fundamental component in determining whether one can 
recognize and process multiple stimuli simultaneously. 
Kahneman illustrates this point by maintaining that the 
routine activities of driving and talking are two 
relatively cognitively-undemanding tasks which are 
successfully accomplished simultaneously. However, 
driving in heavy traffic is more demanding, and so it 
would be expected that conversation would decrease 
during heavy traffic conditions. 
In other words, for a stimulus to be completely 
recognized and processed, Kahneman (1973) posits that 
"cognitive resources" are necessary, and perceives that 
these resources are limited. Further, he believes that the 
more complex the stimuli, a greater amount of 
cognitive resources are demanded for processing. If all 
these resources are eventually exhausted, any additional 
stimuli will go unprocessed—even unnoticed. In like 
manner, when participants in the load condition were 
presented with a demanding task (i.e., computerized 
tests of perceptual skills) it is reasonable to assume 
that all available "cognitive resources" were totally 
consumed so that all other incoming stimuli (i.e., 
exciting or mundane target thoughts) were left 
unrecognized, allowing thought suppression to occur 
easily and effortlessly. Thus, the findings of this study 
are consistent with Csikszentmihlayi's (1978, 1990) 
theory of optimal experience and Kahneman's capacity 
model for attention. 
The Enigma, Examination, and 
Elicitation of Exciting Thoughts. One 
unexpected result of this study demanded investigation: 
exciting thoughts only accounted for 22.9% of all 
thought occurrences across both load conditions relative 
to mundane thoughts (77.1%). Why would exciting 
thoughts be easier to suppress, even in the no-load 
condition? For example, when participants were asked 
to try not to think of sex, reactions ranged from "that 
will be no problem at all" to "I had so many other 
important things on my mind." In contrast, these 
almost resistant responses were absent in the mundane 
thought condition. Participants in this condition 
reported a great deal of difficulty in keeping thoughts of 
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a tree under control. In fact, one participant remarked 
that everything she thought of reminded her of a tree. 
It must be noted that sex was not randomly chosen 
as the exciting target thought—there were actually two 
reasons. First, sex received one of the highest ratings 
for six basic semantic characteristics (i.e., concreteness, 
imagery, categorizability, meaningfulness, familiarity, 
and number of attributes or features; Toglia & Battig, 
1978). In addition, it is also rated as one of the highest 
scoring words for pleasantness. These traits, according 
to Toglia and Battig, can predict the level of emotional 
response expected from a particular word. Specifically, 
words that have high ratings in these qualities elicit 
significant emotional responses; conversely, words 
with low ratings produce little or no emotional 
responses. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, results of a study 
done by Wegner et al. (1990) found that the thought of 
sex was responsible for producing. the most intense 
degree of psychophysiological activity in participants 
compared to several other target words (e.g., Mom, the 
Dean, and dancing). Therefore, it seemed only logical to 
assume that sex would produce the greatest number of 
thought occurrences as well. 
Assuming that all participants were honestly 
reporting any occurrences of target thoughts, reason as 
to why exciting thoughts were easier to suppress than 
mundane thoughts could not be established. However, 
suspicion arose as to whether there was any 
unconscious activity resulting from the suppression of 
exciting thoughts. It was therefore decided to replicate 
the results of the Wegner et al. (1990) study in which 
the suppression of exciting thoughts was examined. 
EDA was chosen as the index of autonomic 
activity since arousal can be measured by recording the 
increases or decreases in skin conductance. 
Relationships between attention and arousal have been 
found to exist to the extent that the amount of effort 
demanded by a task will affect the amount of arousal 
that is experienced by a participant (Kahneman, 1973). 
In addition, results of shadowing studies have indicated 
that electrodermal responses were elicited in participants 
who heard shock-associated words in a nonshadowed 
channel (Dawson & Schell, 1982, 1983). This provided 
supplementary evidence that even though participants 
were not reporting high numbers of exciting thought 
occurrences, they might instead be experiencing arousal 
to the exciting thought. 
The Link Between Cognition, Attention, 
and Absorption. A final issue concerns individual 
susceptibility to suppression. There is the possibility 
that individual differences in personality traits may 
account for why some people may be more likely to 
suppress more successfully than others. It has been  
proposed that the personality trait of absorption could 
be considered a key characteristic possessed by people 
who are successful suppressors, and that this trait 
might even be used as a predictor of the best candidates 
for successful suppression (D. M. Wegner, personal 
communication, October 29, 1993). In addition, a 
significant relationship between absorption and the 
ability to focus attention has been advanced by Miller 
& Foxworth (1992) as a result of their attempt to 
validate the Focus Conscious Attention (FCA) scale, a 
subscale of The Feelings, Reactions, and Beliefs 
Survey (FRBS). 
Absorption is the personality dimension defined as 
the ability to experience deep involvement in 
attentional processing. It is identified by the 
simultaneous integration and dissociation with task-
relevant and -irrelevant stimuli, respectively, resulting 
in the predisposition to enter an altered state of 
consciousness (Roche & McConkey, 1990; Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974). Although absorption has been 
neglected in the past, this quality has been brought to 
the fore as a result of investigations of the attributes of 
highly hypnotizable individuals. Studies indicate that 
some people possess the ability to become totally 
immersed in an activity so that distracting stimuli are 
ignored. "Imaginative involvement," as it is called by 
J. R. Hilgard (as cited in Roche & McConkey, 1990), 
allows for a readiness to become unaware of events that 
may divert attention from a deeply involving incident 
by the intrinsic use of factors such as daydreaming, a 
heightened sense of the attentional object, and 
curiosity—all activated by idiosyncratic and 
unconventional techniques. 
Further, the relevance of absorption is illustrated 
by the fact that high-absorption participants should be 
able to suppress unwanted thoughts more easily relative 
to low-absorption participants. Performances of high-
and low-absorption participants has revealed that there 
are actual physiological differences between these two 
groups—provided that attentional processes are stressed 
at the appropriate level of cognitive demand (Davidson 
et al, 1976). Under conditions that compelled 
attentional resources to be willfully directed (as opposed 
to effortless direction), high absorption participants 
display the ability to selectively restrict the use of 
cortical areas of the brain not involved in processing 
relevant information. In this group, cortical areas of the 
brain responsible for processing relevant information 
are not stimulated (Davidson et al., 1976). For 
example, if asked to be happy, high absorbers would 
instinctively do the reverse and try not to be sad. 
The Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS) is the 
measure most often employed to assets this trait 
(Roche & McConkey, 1990). It is one of eleven 
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primary scales of the Multidimensional Personality 
Questionnaire developed by Tellegen and Atkinson 
(1974; see also Tellegen, 1981, 1982). Participants are 
required to furnish a "True" or "False" response to a 34-
item self-report measure designed to assess imaginative 
activity. According to Tellegen (personal 
communication, July 19, 1994), scoring is quantitative 
and is measured on a continuum as indexed by the 
number of "True" responses (0 - 34) to the items on the 
questionnaire. 
However, even though the TAS and other measures 
were designed to assess this dimension of absorption 
(Coan, 1972; McCrae & Costa, 1983, 1985; Tellegen, 
1981, 1982; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), the extent to 
which these scales can be trusted to reflect an accurate 
rating of the trait has proven to be problematic. When 
the TAS was developed, most studies concerning its 
psychometric validity were conducted mainly on the 
external component of construct validity rather than on 
the substantive or structural components. Internal 
reliability of the external component (r = .88 and a 30-
day-test-retest reliability of r = .91) has been reported 
by Tellegen (1982). In addition, some have found 
strong correlations between the TAS and measures of 
hypnotic experiences, but only with this one 
dimension. However, it is difficult to find any other 
validity or reliability ratings of the TAS. 
Consequently, the psychometric properties of the TAS 
have been called into question. The content of the 
events described in the 34 items designed to determine 
absorption ability has been challenged. The perception 
as to whether absorption should be considered a trait or 
a state also casts doubt on how this construct should be 
measured. Furthermore, differences in administration 
(alone or with other items), response format 
(dichotomous format or Likert-type format), length of 
the scale given (short or long version), and variations 
in scoring methods limit the significance of findings 
from research which has used the TAS (Roche & 
McConkey, 1990). But despite the shortcomings of the 
TAS, it is the best instrument designed thus far for 
measuring the construct of absorption. In view of these 
flaws, restraint will be exercised when interpreting the 
results of the TAS. 
The central purposes of Experiment 2 were to (a) 
test the strength of the focused attention paradigm 
supported by the findings of Experiment 1, (b) replicate 
the results of Wegner et al.'s (1990) study in which 
exciting thoughts were found to produce the most 
psychophysiological activity, and (c) assess whether 
high absorbers found it easier to suppress thoughts than 
low absorbers. 
These ideas were tested by (a) assigning 
participants to one of three incrementally difficult  
conditions of mental load, (b) measuring EDA, and (c) 
by asking participants to complete the TAS—dividing 
participants into high and low absorption groups whose 
thought occurrences could then be compared to their 
absorption status. 
It was hypothesized participants in the highest 
cognitive load condition would find thought 
suppression to be easier and more successful than those 
in the lowest level of cognitive load. This prediction 
was based on the theory that the more complex the 
stimuli, the more conscious capacity is taken up for 
processing thereby leaving no attentional resources 
available to attend to irrelevant stimuli, that is, 
unwanted thoughts (Kahneman, 1973). It was also 
hypothesized that psychophysiological responses to an 
exciting thought would be greater relative to mundane 
thoughts as measured by participants' EDA. This 
assumption developed by recognizing the possibility 
that the participants in Experiment 1 might not have 
been aware of any conscious exciting thought 
intrusions, but were nonetheless undergoing 
unconscious emotional excitation (Wegner et al., 
1990). Finally, it was predicted that a prerequisite for 
successful thought suppression would be manifested by 
a high score in the trait of absorption. This prediction 
was based on findings of previous research that high-
absorption participants were thought to be able to focus 
attention totally on a particular stimulus (Miller & 
Foxworth, 1992; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Forty undergraduates (9 males, 31 
females) from introductory and upper-class psychology 
classes at Moravian College Bethlehem, PA, 
volunteered in the study in return for course credit. 
Mean age of this group was 21 (SD = 5.29). None of 
the participants in this study were interviewed for 
Experiment 1 or 3. One participant withdrew from the 
study shortly after it began; therefore, data from 39 
participants were analyzed. 
Procedure. Participants were seen individually by 
the first experimenter who explained that participants 
would be invited to complete a questionnaire, test their 
motor skills, measure their ability to concentrate, and 
assess the level of stress that all these tasks might 
generate. 
In order to assess the level (high or low) of 
absorption ability, all participants were asked to 
complete the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS), one of 
the primary scales derived from the Multidimensional 
Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen 1981, 1982; 
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Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). After the questionnaire 
was completed and returned to the experimenter, each 
participant was led to another location and seated in a 
chair which was placed in front of a mirror-tracing 
apparatus. 
Participants were then told that their motor skills 
would be tested and were asked to perform a mirror-
tracing task (Humphries, Thomas & Nelson, 1991). 
Participants were asked to trace the image of a star as 
seen in a mirror on duplicate sheets of the star placed 
perpendicular to the mirror and which could not be seen 
by the participant. Incrementally challenging levels of 
tracing difficulty were considered to be viable 
manipulations of mental load and were designated as 
follows: Tracing the stimulus clockwise with the 
participant's dominant hand (low level of load); tracing 
the stimulus clockwise with participant's non-dominant 
hand (intermediate level of load); and, tracing the 
stimulus counterclockwise with participant's non-
dominant hand (highest level of load). 
The participant was then asked to indicate his or 
her dominant hand for proper EDA electrode placement. 
To assuage any apprehension about this phase of the 
study, participants were apprised of the operation of the 
EDA electrodes by being informed that their purpose 
was to simply detect and record any changes in the 
skin's electrical conductance during the experiment. 
While each participant was being prepared, instructions 
for the mirror-tracing task were given. The first 
experimenter sat directly adjacent to the participant and 
gave verbal instructions and a demonstration of how to 
perform the task. The participant was asked to look at a 
stimulus sheet held by the experimenter as instructions 
were given by physically showing the participant the 
exact direction in which they were to trace their 
stimulus sheets. The experimenter kept track of the 
beginning and end of each trial by placing a mark on a 
transparency of the stimulus and later transferring it 
onto the participant's actual stimulus sheet. 
Instructions were based on the level of difficulty of 
the condition to which participants were assigned. 
Group 1 (low level of load) was told: "When you are 
instructed, please pick up your pen with your dominant 
hand, place the pen at the top of the star, like this, and 
begin tracing between the lines made by the two stars 
in a clockwise direction." Group 2 (intermediate level 
of load) received the same instructions—except they 
were asked to trace with their non-dominant hand in a 
clockwise direction. Participants in Group 3 (highest 
level of load) were asked to trace with their non-
dominant hand in a counterclockwise direction. 
Participants were not given the opportunity to practice 
tracing the star in order to avoid (as much as possible)  
practice effects. Thought instructions and thought 
targets were counterbalanced across participants. 
After the participant was told that thought 
instructions would be given as the experiment 
progressed, a second experimenter, who operated the 
computer, began the procedure by asking the participant 
to "Please begin tracing, but do not think of anything." 
At the end of that baseline interval, directions were 
given to continue tracing and to suppress the first target 
thought (e.g., "Please continue tracing but do not think 
of a tree. If you think about a tree or anything 
connected with a tree, please tell us"). After 2 min, 
participants were given the same instructions, but were 
asked to think about a tree. During the second baseline 
interval, directions were given to "Please continue 
tracing, but do not tell us your thoughts". Identical 
thought instructions were given for the next two 
periods, but the second thought target (sex) was used. 
To end the experiment, participants were requested to 
repeat the baseline requirements. Each participant was 
fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
EDA Measurement. Each participant's EDA 
was measured by using the standard instructions 
provided in the Guide for the Biofeedback Microlab 
Software Package (HRM Software—Apple. version, 
1989). The sensor cable was connected to the 
electrodermal activity input on the Microlab Interface. 
Participants' fingers were cleansed with alcohol (as 
electrode conductivity gel is not advised for EDA 
measurements) and the two EDA sensors (23mm 
Snapon Ag/AgCI permanent electrodes) were attached 
to the second and third fingers of each participants's free 
hand (i.e., whichever hand was not being used to 
perform the mirror-tracing task) by means of velcro 
strips. Tape was used to secure the sensor cable to the 
participant's hand in order to reduce sensor movement 
and to insure accurate measurement. Readings were 
taken every 10 sec and saved on hardcopy so that an 
average of each 2 min trial could be obtained. 
Following Wegner et al., 1990, EDA was recorded 
throughout the study beginning with a 2 min baseline 
reading during which participants were at rest and free 
of task involvement. Immediately following this 
baseline period, participants were requested to begin 
tracing the star stimulus according to the instructions 
specified for the level of mental load to which they 
were assigned (low, intermediate or high). For the next 
two 2 min periods, participants were asked first to 
suppress (not to verbalize) and then to express 
(verbalize) the first of two target thoughts (a mundane 
thought, stone, or an exciting thought, sex). For this 
experiment, a stone—instead of a tree—was chosen as 
the mundane target thought. This follows the criteria 
suggested by Toglia and Battig (1978) used in 
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Experiment 1 (see Discussion for Experiment 2). 
Participants were also instructed to verbalize all 
occurrences of target thought intrusions. A second 
baseline reading was then taken while participants were 
(again) at rest. Another pair of 2 min segments ensued 
during which participants followed the original 
instructions with the exception of suppressing and then 
expressing the second target thought. Thus, each 
participant ultimately suppressed and expressed both the 
mundane and the exciting thought while executing the 
mirror-tracing task. A third baseline reading completed 
the experiment. EDA deviation for each suppression 
and expression trial was determined following Wegner 
et al.'s (1990) directions to (a) take the mean of the 
EDA baseline periods preceding and following each 
condition and then (b) subtract the EDA condition mean 
from it. 
Mirror-Tracing Apparatus. The instrument 
(Mirror Tracer, Model #31010, Lafayette Instrument 
Co.) consisted of a horizontal metal plate with a copy 
of a six-pointed star (Mirror Tracings Stars, Model 
#31110, Lafayette Instrument Co.) placed on it which 
was blocked from the participant's view by an 
adjustable metal shield. To trace the star, participants 
had to rely on the image of the star as seen in a mirror 
positioned behind and perpendicular to the plate on 
which the star was placed. The image of the star was 
actually composed of two concentric stars—one 
approximately one-quarter of an inch inside the other. 
This configuration created a path within which the 
participant, using a pen, was required to trace third line. 
Measures consisted of the number of stars completed 
and the number of errors counted. An error resulted each 
time the traced line exited and then re-entered the 
pathway. One point was given for any single error; five 
and ten points were given respectively for perseverative 
sections: 1/2 inch and 1 inch masses of uncountable, 
tightly compacted errors. The length of each tracing 
trial matched that of each suppression and expression 
trial (2 min). 
Results 
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed utilizing Conditions (target thoughts [sex 
and tree] and thought instructions [suppression and 
expression]) as repeated measures factors. Gender, 
Cognitive Load Groups (low, medium, high), and 
Absorption scores were used as between groups factors. 
The dependent variables were EDA measurement, TAS 
scores, errors and number of stimulus sheets completed 
for the tracing task, and thought occurrences. 
There were no statistically significant gender 
differences or other between-subject effects, F < 1, p >  
.05. A median split was performed on the TAS scores 
(Mdn = 21) to create two subject groups (high vs. low 
absorbers). Following Wegner et al. (1990), EDA 
scores were calculated. The resulting EDA scores were 
then analyzed by a 2 (high vs. low absorption) x 2 
(suppress vs. express) x 2 (mundane vs. exciting) 
ANOVA, where absorption served as a between-subject 
factor and thought instructions and target thoughts were 
repeated-measures. A within-subjects main effect for 
target thought indicated that mundane thoughts were 
associated with lower EDA activity than exciting ones, 
replicating Wegner et al. (1990), F[1,37] = 7.27, p < 
.02); however, this result was qualified by an 
Absorption x Target Thought interaction, F[1,37] = 
5.35, p < .03. Low absorbers had lower average EDA 
activity for mundane rather than exciting thoughts, 
while high absorbers had relatively higher average EDA 
levels for mundane rather than exciting thoughts. A 
marginally significant within-subjects effect for 
thought instruction indicated that suppression was 
associated with lower EDA activity than was 
expression, F(1,37) = 3.51, p < .07. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 produced three principle findings. 
First, as predicted, participants experienced more 
physiological activity from the exciting target thought 
of sex than to the mundane target thought of stone. In 
this respect, Wegner et al.'s (1990) study was 
replicated, providing support for the assumption that 
even though conscious occurrences of an exciting 
thought may be low or non-existent, there still may be 
some emotional responses which are generated by an 
exciting thought. Such a finding hints at the 
possibility that conscious (thought occurrences) and 
unconscious (physiological activity) responses to 
exciting thoughts may, at times, be mutually 
exclusive: One does not need to be aware of the thought 
of sex to respond emotionally to it. In fact, to 
generalize this notion, it may be that any unconscious 
subjectively arousing thought could cause an emotional 
reaction which might be responsible for engendering 
any number of feelings (e.g., anxiety, exhilaration, or 
depression). This assumption is supported by findings 
of Wegner et al.'s (1990) study which suggest that 
phobias and obsessive preoccupations may be 
motivated by the suppression of exciting thoughts. 
The Effect of Absorption on Attention. A 
second principle finding pertains to the significance of 
the interaction found among EDA, absorption, and 
target thoughts: EDA activity was lower for low 
absorbers when they thought about a stone than when 
they thought about sex, but higher for high absorbers 
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when they thought about a stone rather than sex. 
Further, high absorbers experienced just about as many 
target thought intrusions (n = 305) as low absorbers (n 
= 289). Interpretation of these data, however, has 
proven to be problematic due to the ambiguous 
performance of participants and the experimental nature 
of previous research concerning absorption and 
attention. For example, psychophysiological differences 
between high- and low-absorbers have indeed been 
documented—but of critical importance was the degree 
of participants' attentional involvement and the 
appropriate level of task demands placed on those 
participants (Davidson et al., 1976). 
Attentional involvement, even in a controlled 
environment, may be a function of a participant's 
subjective evaluation of the necessary effort needed to 
be put forth in order to achieve the specific goals of an 
experiment. In addition, situational circumstances (e.g., 
fatigue, preoccupation, motivation) existing at the time 
of data collection may have interfered with the 
attainment of an accurate measure of this variable. 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that physiological 
differences may be contingent upon individual 
differences—a predicament which makes it difficult to 
reliably interpret the data. 
The relevance of the effect of absorption on 
attention may also be dependent upon the type of 
measurement employed. Here again, disparate results 
make interpretation difficult. In studies using 
biofeedback procedures to control heart rate and blood 
pressure, the relevance of absorption was clearly 
supported, but inconclusive results were obtained in 
studies using electromyographic activity as a dependent 
measure (Roche & McConkey, 1990). In other studies, 
absorption was demonstrated to be irrelevant when skin 
temperature was used as a dependent measure (Roberts, 
Schuler, Bacon, Zimmerman & Patterson, 1975), 
although it has been argued that changes in skin 
conductance levels are second only to dilation of the 
pupils in measuring indications of arousal (Kahneman, 
1973). Finally, to further complicate matters, it is not 
entirely clear what the state of arousal is exactly 
measuring—what the participant is actually doing, the 
effort that is being put forth to accomplish a task, or 
the stress level that either of these determinants may 
—
generate (Kahneman, 1973). In other words, is the 
physiological activity due to mental load, unconscious 
emotional reaction, or to anxiety? In view of all this 
conflicting information, the interaction among EDA, 
absorption, and target thoughts cannot be clearly 
interpreted. Further research is needed in this area in 
order to accurately determine the cause and the meaning 
of such activity. 
The Relationship between Attention and 
Arousal. The third principle finding which approached 
significance was participants' experience of greater 
physiological response when they expressed a target 
thought than when they suppressed a target thought. 
This is important because it contradicts the results of 
Wegner et al.'s (1990) study in which no main effect 
was found for suppression versus expression. Increases 
in skin conductance levels were recorded, but they were 
apparent only during the suppression of the thought of 
sex. 
This puzzling difference may be explained in the 
theoretical context of the Yerkes-Dodson Law (as cited 
in Kahneman, 1973) which describes the correlation 
between arousal and performance. In keeping with the 
capacity model of attention (Kahneman, 1973), there is 
a mutual relationship between attention and arousal. 
Attentional demands influence the degree of arousal 
experienced; conversely, the intensity of arousal 
influences the allocation of attentional output in a 
hierarchical manner necessary to accomplish various 
activities. Recall that the participants in the expression 
condition were asked to do three things: (a) To 
specifically think about their assigned target thought; 
(b) to perform a mirror-tracing task of a low, medium, 
or high level of difficulty; and (c), to verbalize any 
intrusion of the assigned target thought. Participants in 
Wegner et al.'s (1990) study were requested to express 
(or suppress) a target thought while verbalizing their 
stream of consciousness, but were not placed under any 
type of mental load—a factor which may help to 
explain the difference in results. A request to express a 
thought, either exciting or mundane, requires much 
more intentionality and voluntary effort to command 
the mind to focus on that thought as opposed to a 
request to suppress that thought (see Experiment 1). 
Therefore, since more effort is expended when 
expressing a thought, physiological activity would be 
expected to increase correspondingly with that necessary 
elevated level of effort. Presumably, this is exactly 
what occurred in Experiment 2 as increased arousal was 
experienced by participants in the expression condition. 
The Non-Significant Effect of Mental 
Load on Suppression. One disappointing finding 
of Experiment 2 which invites investigation is the 
absence of a significant between-groups effect of mental 
load on suppression. The mirror-tracing task was 
chosen as a measure that could be manipulated in order 
to yield three increasingly difficult levels of mental 
load. Since more difficult tasks require more effort and 
attention (Kahneman, 1973), it was predicted that 
participants placed in the highest level of load would 
allocate most of their attentional capacities to the 
tracing task. The remaining cognitive resources would 
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be so limited—even possibly non-existent—that 
processing of any other stimuli (i.e., target thoughts) 
would be impossible. Suppression would therefore 
occur more easily and successfully for the participants 
in the high load condition relative to the participants in 
the low and medium load conditions. However, the 
results did not confirm this expectation. 
Dispositional attributes could account for the non-
'significant effect of mental load on suppression; 
characteristics of the participants themselves may be 
responsible for the failure of the prediction. High 
absorbers tend naturally to direct their attentional 
capacities toward internal events (experiential set) while 
low absorbers prefer an external goal-oriented 
orientation (instrumental set; Qualls & Sheehan, 1981; 
Tellegen, 1981). In this experiment, verbal instructions 
were given to the participants at the beginning of each 
2 min trial. During each suppression-expression period, 
each participant was first asked to continue tracing 
while carrying out specific thought instructions. High 
absorbers may have experienced those thought 
instructions as a hindrance to their inclination to 
become engrossed in the mirror-tracing task. According 
to the prediction, this task-oriented focus should have 
enabled them to suppress target thoughts, but because 
their concentration may have been disrupted with each 
thought instruction, this was not the case. Low 
absorbers, on the other hand, should have perceived the 
verbal instructions as a constant redirection of their 
goal, thereby facilitating their performance in achieving 
successful suppression. However, it is conceivable that 
because low absorbers are externally oriented, 
instructing them to perform the mirror-tracing task, 
suppress or express a target thought, and to verbalize 
any thought intrusions may have split their attention to 
such an extent that their performance was hampered. 
Consequently, any predicted effect of mental load on 
suppression was prevented. 
Cognitive Tasks vs. Motor Tasks. Finally, 
an analysis of the type of mental load used in this 
experiment may prove to be an additional possible 
explanation for the lack of effect of mental load on 
suppression. Recalling that computerized tests of 
perceptual skills were used as mental load for 
Experiment 1 and a mirror-tracing task was used as a 
mental load for Experiment 2, is it possible that tests 
of perceptual skills might place more of a cognitive 
load on attentional processes than the mirror-tracing 
task? Could there be a difference in the demand that is 
required of a cognitive task versus a motor task? And if 
so, could that difference be the variable responsible for 
the effectiveness of the type of load used to achieve 
successful thought suppression in Experiment 1, as  
well as the failure to achieve successful thought 
suppression in Experiment 2? 
The answer may lie in understanding mode-specific 
cortical patterning. Complex brain behavior 
interactions, 	 as 	 measured 	 by 	 cerebral 
psychophysiological methods, have shown that 
individuals vary significantly in the amount of cortical 
involvement observed during attentional tasks 
(Davidson et al., 1976). For example, in one 
experiment conducted by Spong, Haider, and Lindsley 
(as cited in Davidson et al., 1976), the greatest response 
recorded for participants attending to visual stimuli 
occurred in the occipital cortex, while the greatest 
response recorded for participants attending to auditory 
stimuli occurred in the temporal cortex. If this line of 
reasoning is followed, it can be argued that the two 
different types of load used in the first two experiments 
affected two different cortical areas of the brain. This 
distinction is important because the functions of these 
cortical areas may disclose a disproportionate outlay of 
effortful and noneffortful attentional performance which 
may account for the contradictory results of the two 
types of mental load used in the first two studies. 
A review of the specific perceptual tasks used in 
Experiment 1 reveals that tests such as signal detection, 
feature detection, pattern recognition and comparison of 
visual information were taken. These tasks required the 
use of cognitive processes that included counting, 
visual scanning, visual comparison, reading, and spatial 
organization—to name a few. Such operations are 
performed primarily by the occipital cortex (visual) and 
the frontal cortex (higher mental processes), and place 
an extremely heavy and sustained cognitive load on 
attentional processes. In contrast, the mirror-tracing 
task was much less cognitively engaging by requiring 
participants to draw—a task that, with practice, 
eventually allowed participants to work by rote. 
Although the occipital cortex is also involved in this 
process, the operation is chiefly performed by the 
parietal cortex and requires not so much a cognitive, 
but a motorical demand, in terms of mental load (M. 
D'Iorio; personal communication, March 21, 1995). 
This neuropsychological perspective fits nicely with 
Kahneman's (1973) capacity model of attention: most 
or all of participants' attentional resources were 
consumed in Experiment 1. Therefore, the load variable 
seems to explain why successful thought suppression 
was achieved in Experiment 1 and not in Experiment 2. 
Acoustic vs. Semantic Processing. A third 
study was designed to test the notion that participants 
would be able to suppress more successfully when 
working under a challenging cognitive load. 
Additionally, the mental load chosen for this 
experiment would have to impose a heavy demand on 
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the same cortical areas that were effected in Experiment 
1. A task which necessitated participants to encode, 
store, and retrieve stimuli would be considered to pose 
an appropriate demand on cognitive resources (M. 
D'Iorio, personal communication, March 21, 1995). 
Consequently, depth of processing (shallow versus deep 
processing) was selected as the type of mental load for 
Experiment 3. 
Depth of processing is a relatively simple method 
of analyzing how a stimulus is encoded into memory. 
Such processing can be thought of as existing on a 
continuum, simple physical encoding at one end 
(acoustic) and a deeper encoding (semantic) at the other 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972). During acoustic encoding, 
only the physical characteristics of the stimulus may 
require attention (e.g., how may vowels are in a word). 
Because very little processing is necessary to decide the 
number of vowels in a word, the stimulus is said to be 
processed on a shallow (nonsemantic) level, and 
therefore imposes an almost trivial demand on 
cognitive resources. In addition, stimuli processed on a 
shallow level will provide a less durable memory code 
so that recall of stimulus words will be poor (Craik, 
1979; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973; 
Parkin, 1984). 
During semantic encoding, stimuli are processed 
on a deeper cognitive level (i.e., a judgment about a 
word). In order to evaluate the quality of a word, more 
effort is required in terms of cognitive energy. For 
example, if asked to determine whether a word is 
pleasant or unpleasant, participants would need to think 
about their past experiences concerning that word, what 
others would think about that word, and comparisons 
between the two sets of criteria. A deeper analysis of 
the stimulus is therefore required resulting in a more 
durable memory code and a greater rate of recall than 
words processed on an acoustic level. It follows, then, 
that the nature of the memory code would be an 
indication of the level of cognitive processing utilized 
to encode the stimulus (Craik 1979; Craik & Lockhart, 
1972; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973; Parkin, 1984). 
The purposes of Experiment 3 were threefold: (a) 
To again replicate the results of Wegner et al.'s (1990) 
study showing that subjects demonstrated higher 
physiological activity when suppressing exciting 
thoughts than when suppressing mundane thoughts; (b) 
to assess whether high absorbers found it easier to 
suppress target thoughts than low absorbers; and, (c) to 
test the demands of a more cognitive load on the ability 
to achieve successful thought suppression. It was 
hypothesized that participants' EDA recordings would 
be high during suppression periods of exciting thoughts 
versus mundane thoughts; that high absorbers would be 
more successful at suppression than low absorbers; and,  
that depth of processing as cognitive load would 
promote successful thought suppression. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Design and Overview. In this 2 (exciting 
thought vs. mundane thought) x 2 (low cognitive load 
vs. high cognitive load) design, participants were asked 
to suppress either the exciting or mundane thought 
while processing a tape-recorded list of 20 words (see 
Appendix) on either a shallow or a deep level (Parkin, 
1984). As in Experiment 2, the TAS was administered 
to assess participants' level of absorption ability and 
EDA was measured continuously throughout the 
experiment. After hearing the word list, a distraction 
task was introduced before asking the participants to 
recall as many of the words on the list as possible. 
Participants and Procedure. Twenty-four 
undergraduates (11 males, 13 females) from 
introductory and upper-level psychology Moravian 
College, Bethlehem, PA, participated in the study in 
return for course credit. The mean age of volunteers was 
23 (SD = 6.80). Again, none of the participants in this 
study were interviewed for either Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2. 
Participants were seen individually and were first 
asked to complete the TAS. Using the same procedure 
and equipment as in Experiment 2 for measuring 
electrodermal activity, EDA sensors were attached to 2 
fingers of each participant's non-dominant hand. During 
this time, participants were given a pre-numbered sheet 
with numbers from 1 to 20 and advised of their 
assignments. First, a 1 min baseline reading would be 
recorded during which they were instructed not to move 
or speak. Approximately 30 sec into that baseline 
segment, the participants would be receiving directions 
from the experimenter to listen to a tape recording of 
20 words (see Appendix), spaced 3 sec apart. The task 
of the low-level group was to determine whether each 
word had the letter "E" in it (acoustic processing). If it 
did, they were told to write a "Y" for "Yes" next to the 
corresponding number on the sheet. If the word did not 
have an "E" in it, they were asked to write an "N" for 
"no" next to the corresponding number. The task of the 
high-level group was to determine the emotional 
quality of each word (i.e., if the word had a good or bad 
connotation to it; semantic processing). If they thought 
the word had a good connotation, participants were 
asked to write a "G" next to the corresponding number; 
if the word had a bad connotation, they were asked to 
write a "B" next to the corresponding number. 
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Additionally, participants were asked to suppress 
either a mundane (tree) or an exciting (sex) target 
thought. Since this experiment was designed to be 
comparison of cognitive resources as explored in 
Experiment 1, no expression of target thoughts was 
required of the participants. The choice of mundane 
target thought in this experiment was "tree" (as in 
Experiment 1) rather than "stone" (as in Experiment 2). 
Again, this decision was made in order to follow as 
closely as possible the procedure used in Experiment 1 
so that cognitive functioning could be examined. 
Participants were also asked to verbalize any instances 
of target thought intrusions to the experimenter while 
performing their acoustic or semantic assignments. 
A second and final 1 min baseline period completed 
the trial, after which participants were given a 
distraction task: they were asked to count up the 
number of "Y", "N", "G", or "B" responses on their 
respective sheets and to enter those scores in the 
appropriately marked boxes. Then, the participants were 
asked to recall as many of the words on the list as they 
could and to write them down on the back of the sheet. 
Recall time did not exceed 2 min in any case. The 
experimenter then removed the EDA sensors, debriefed 
the volunteers, and thanked them for their participation. 
Results 
This experiment investigated the hypothesis that 
depth of processing would place such an appropriate and 
sufficient cognitive load on attentional processes that 
successful thought suppression would result. ANOVAs 
were performed using cognitive load (low vs. high), 
target thoughts (exciting vs. mundane), word lists, 
absorption scores, and gender as between group factors. 
Dependent measures consisted of EDA measurement, 
thought occurrences and word recall. 
To verify that there were no effects due to the two 
different word lists, an ANOVA was conducted on each 
of the dependent measures (i.e., recall, thought 
occurrences, and EDA). As anticipated, there were no 
differences (all Fs < 1.00, ps > .05). 
A cognitive load x target thought ANOVA was 
conducted on word recall. A significant main effect for 
load was found, F(1,23) = 58.39, p < .001. As 
expected, processing words on a semantic level (M = 
11.40) facilitated higher recall of stimulus words than 
when processed on an acoustic level (M = 6.43; Craik, 
1979; Parkin, 1984). A significant main effect for a 
gender x high absorption score ANOVA was also 
found, F(1,23) = 16.98, p < .001, indicating that 
females in this sample (M = 23.38) were higher 
absorbers than the males (M = 16.64). There were no 
other between-group effects. 
However, further analyses indicate that only 75% 
of the participants in this study reported any thought 
occurrences at all: 67% of participants in the low load 
condition reported having no thought occurrences and 
84% of participants in the high load condition reported 
having no thought occurrences. It is also interesting to 
note that EDA was elevated for both exciting (M = 
+4.6) and mundane (M = +4.6) target thought groups. 
Finally, more thought intrusions were experienced by 
low absorbers (n = 21) than high absorbers (n = 11). 
Discussion 
In this Experiment, the assumption that 
participants placed under low cognitive load would 
report more target thoughts than participants placed 
under high cognitive load was tested. Because semantic 
processing allows for higher word recall due to a deeper 
level of cognitive analysis (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), it 
was expected . that participants in this semantic 
processing group would have fewer thought occurrences 
than participants in the acoustic processing condition 
(Craik, 1979; Parkin, 1984). However, the results of 
the ANOVA did not confirm this assumption. It 
appears that because there was no significant difference 
between the two groups, both semantic and acoustic 
levels of processing were effective in producing thought 
suppression. 
This disappointing result notwithstanding, we 
believe that we have gathered support for the primary 
hypothesis: the nature of the cognitive load used to 
facilitate successful thought suppression must be such 
that it places an appropriate level of demand on 
attentional resources in order to be successful. In this 
respect, Experiment 3 was significant. Since 75% of all 
participants reported having no thought intrusions 
whatsoever, it is strongly suggested that depth of 
processing indeed promoted successful thought 
suppression across both load groups. To further 
illustrate this point, it was discovered during 
postexperimental interviews that participants in the 
exciting thought condition experienced most thought 
intrusions following the recognition of certain words 
on the stimulus list as cues to the assigned target 
thought of sex (i.e., boy, girl, and hot). Although there 
was a non-significant effect of cognitive load on 
thought occurrences between groups, it is important to 
understand that there is still enough substantial 
evidence to indicate that thought suppression was 
achieved when depth of processing was used as 
cognitive load. To the extent that thought suppression 
is achieved when participants are placed under the 
appropriate level of mental load, the findings of 
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Experiment 1 were replicated, and support for the 
focused attention was reinforced. 
Another interesting finding in Experiment 3 was 
the lack of effect of EDA measurement across both 
target thought groups. The prediction that greater 
physiological activity would be experienced by 
participants in the exciting target thought group—
replicating Wegner et al.'s, (1990) study and our 
Experiment 2—was incorrect, as EDA activity 
increased in all but three cases (2 participants 
experienced a decrease in EDA activity and one showed 
no difference at all). Why might this have happened? 
One explanation is possible in terms of 
Kahneman's (1973) theoretical framework regarding the 
orientation reaction (OR). The OR is a pattern of 
heightened physiological responses caused by the 
anticipation of a stimulus. In this experiment, the 
stimulus necessary to evoke such a response would be 
the task requiring participants to process the word list 
on either an acoustic or semantic level. Unofficial 
observations made by the experimenter who monitored 
EDA activity on the computer screen confirm this 
notion: In 88% of the trials, all physiological activity 
increased during the period when participants were 
required to process the word list, compared to decreased 
levels of EDA activity recorded during pretask and 
posttask periods of rest. This explanation is consistent 
with Kahneman's (1973) capacity model of attention, 
which posits that the amount of arousal experienced is 
directly proportionate to the amount of effort invested 
in a task—or in the mobilization to perform a task. 
Although the mobilization effect is not typically 
maintained over a long period of time, it is certainly 
reasonable to presume that this 
	 can indeed be 
maintained over a period of 60 sec (the length of each 
segment in Experiment 3). 
In addition, time-pressure is an element that 
imposes a heavy demand on resources causing increased 
arousal (Kahneman, 1973). In the experiment, when 
participants were given instructions, they were told that 
they would hear a tape recording of word list containing 
20 words, each spaced 3 sec apart, and that they needed 
to make a semantic or acoustic judgment about that 
word. The time-pressure that was created by this request 
might have caused some additional arousal that was 
recorded for this segment of the experiment. A final 
comment concerns the finding that more thought 
intrusions were reported by low rather than high 
absorbers. It was expected that high absorbers would 
suppress better than low absorbers, and this indeed was 
the case. In view of this information, we must wonder 
why these results were obtained in Experiment 3 but 
not in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 3, participants had only two tasks: 
To make decisions about some words and to suppress a 
target thought. It may be that high absorbers were fully 
able to utilize their preferred experiential set. These 
high absorbers might have accomplished these tasks by 
means of focusing their attention solely on the 
stimulus words themselves. By using their ability to 
narrow their focus internally on a stimulus, high 
absorbers were troubled by very few, target thought 
intrusions. In contrast, it is possible that low absorbers 
were not able to adopt their preferred instrument set. 
Because there were no external stimuli to constantly 
redirect their attention to the goal at hand (processing of 
stimulus words), low absorbers were not able to keep 
their minds focused on those stimulus words which 
allowed target thought to intrude more often. This 
pattern can be supported by the fact that low absorbers 
recalled fewer words (n = 72) than high absorbers (n = 
118): High absorbers demonstrated relatively greater 
powers of concentration than low absorbers. 
General Discussion 
Results of previous research suggest that thought 
suppression is extremely difficult to accomplish—even 
futile—if one is using self-distraction methods that are 
solely dependent upon internal thought distracters 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992, 1993; Wegner et al., 1987; 
Wegner et al., 1990; Wenzlaff et al., 1991; Wenzlaff et 
al., 1988). Nevertheless, these studies have provided 
some valuable information about the techniques of 
intentional mind control. 
Suppression strategies have included the use of 
unfocused self-distraction (thinking of an assortment of 
unassigned, unrelated items; Wegner et al., 1987) and 
focused self-distraction (using a single assigned 
distracter; Wegner et al., 1987, Experiment 2; Wegner, 
1989; Wegner et al., 1990). However, these attempts at 
willful and effortful mind control have been shown to 
invariably fail for several reasons. For instance, when 
engaging in unfocused self-distraction methods, 
unassigned distracters generated cyclic thought patterns 
(Wegner et al., 1987) and environmental cues that 
eventually led subjects back to the original unwanted 
thought (Wegner et al., 1991). This situation 
foreshadowed the unavoidable depletion of effective 
thought distracters. Assigned single distracters allowed 
for more successful suppression, but required the 
possession and implementation of strong attentional 
powers (Wegner & Schneider, 1989). Consequently, 
thought suppression as a mechanism of intentional 
mental control has been proven to be unsuccessful. 
Another approach to conquer unwanted thoughts 
was investigated in this study based on 
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Csikszentmihalyi's (1978, 1990) theory of optimal 
experience (flow). A state of flow is typically 
recognized by self-reports of enjoyment, concentration, 
or deep involvement described by people engaged in a 
challenging task—provided the activity is not beyond 
the individual's capacities (i.e., not too demanding to 
provoke anxiety or not demanding enough to invite 
boredom). A condition of happiness, peak performance, 
and loss of self-consciousness derive from this 
experiential event, all of which contribute to total 
absorption in the episode. Most importantly, once a 
person is experiencing this state of intense focused 
attention, an altered state of awareness occurs and a 
unique consequence ensues: All other unpleasant or 
unwanted mental information is involuntarily 
forgotten. This dimension of the flow state is a 
significant by-product of the experience because it 
implies that enjoyable and challenging activities require 
complete attention to the task at hand, thereby leaving 
no room for irrelevant material (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990). It was therefore expected that if a synthesis of 
thought distraction theory (Wegner, 1989) and optimal 
experience theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) could be 
achieved, experience would prove to be the appropriate 
thought distracter necessary to accomplish successful 
thought suppression. 
Experiment 1 examined whether participants would 
be able to achieve successful suppression if absorbed in 
an experiential and challenging activity. Cognitive load 
for this study consisted of computerized tests of 
perceptual skills. While performing these tests, 
participants were asked to suppress either a mundane 
(tree) or exciting (sex) target thought. As predicted, 
concentration overwhelmingly facilitated successful 
thought suppression. Although it was expected that 
there would be more exciting thoughts recorded than 
mundane thoughts, this result was not obtained. 
Experiment 2 was therefore designed to explore the 
surprising results of the first study by replicating 
research conducted by Wegner et al. (1990) in which 
physiological responses to exciting thoughts were 
found to be significant. To that end, participants' EDAs 
were recorded to measure whether exciting target 
thoughts could be producing physiological arousal—
even though exciting thoughts were not breaking into 
consciousness as often as expected. In addition, the 
possibility that there could be a predisposition for 
successful thought suppression was addressed by 
evaluating the absorption ability of participants as 
measured by the TAS (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). 
In the second experiment, a mirror-tracing task 
provided three incrementally difficult levels of mental 
load. Data indicated that mundane thoughts were 
associated with lower EDA activity versus exciting  
ones, replicating Wegner et al's. (1990) results. 
However, cognitive load did not significantly promote 
thought suppression. These findings suggested two 
possibilities: (a) In contrast to the heavy and sustained 
cognitive load used in Experiment 1, the mirror-tracing 
task was an easier, motorical task, and so less 
cognitively demanding; and (b) the amount of cortical 
involvement during the performance of each task was 
significantly different. This information was enough to 
speculate that the load variable was the reason 
suppression succeeded in the first study and failed in the 
second. 
Using depth of processing as cognitive load, 
Experiment 3 tested the probability that the type of 
mental load under which a participant was placed was 
indeed of critical importance to the validity of the 
focused attention hypothesis. As anticipated, 
suppression was again successful. It was concluded that 
the nature of the cognitive load was of critical 
importance in placing the appropriate demand on 
attentional resources in order to facilitate suppression. 
Intentionality is the Key 
Clearly, these current findings imply that under 
conditions of appropriate cognitive (or mental) load, 
successful thought suppression can and does occur. If 
thought distracters are experiential in nature and the 
demand of the mental load produced by that experience 
is such that cognitive capacity is sufficiently occupied, 
as well as narrowly focused, there is evidence that 
unwanted thoughts can be banished from our minds. 
However, the most critical factor is that attention must 
be captured involuntarily or suppression will fail just 
as surely as it does when intentional mind control is 
attempted. 
It is essential, however, to make certain that these 
findings are not interpreted as evidence that in order to 
rid oneself of unwanted thoughts, all one has to do is 
concentrate on alternative stimuli. It is not enough to 
say that one must "concentrate" on something else in 
order to achieve successful thought suppression. As a 
mechanism of mental control intended to direct our 
thoughts elsewhere, concentration is just as susceptible 
to the same frustrating characteristics and consequences 
that plague suppression—provided the process is 
initiated deliberately (Wegner, 1994). Thus, if 
suppression is a consequence of an individual's 
spontaneous absorption and interaction with 
subjectively attractive or challenging elements of his or 
her environment, we believe it will be successful. 
The emphasis on whether control is achieved on a 
voluntary or involuntary basis is an important 
distinction that must be made in order to properly 
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understand the implications of the current studies. 
Recent research in the domain of mental control 
proposes that under conditions of mental load sufficient 
to reduce cognitive capacity, not only is suppression 
inhibited, but the opposite of what is intended 
ironically occurs (Wegner, 1994). For example, if one 
is trying to sleep while under load, wakefulness will 
result; if one is trying to relax under load, anxiety 
develops. The theory of ironic processes seems to be 
inconsistent with the results of the research contained 
herein. 
An understanding of what lies at the heart of the 
ironic process theory will illustrate the difference 
between the two theories. Wegner et al's. (1990) basic 
concept asserts that there are two processes that are 
implemented when mental control is desired: The 
operating process, which is responsible for filling the 
mind with the pertinent thoughts and sensations 
necessary to achieve an intended state, and the 
monitoring process, which scans the mind for mental 
contents that are in opposition to that intended state. 
The operating process is a conscious and effortful 
operation; the monitoring process is usually an 
unconscious and autonomous operation—and therefore 
requires less effort. If the monitoring process finds any 
undesirable contents, a situation which indicates control 
failure, its job is to reinitiate the operating process so 
that the intended state is restored. Because the monitor 
is constantly scanning the mind for conditions of 
control failure, most of the mind's resources are 
continuously dedicated to being watchful for any 
indications that mental control is failing. When placed 
under mental load, that capacity to scan for failure is 
substantially reduced, and the monitor not only searches 
for incompatible contents but ironically creates them 
itself. 
It is logical to agree that, under cognitive load, 
there could be an obvious reduction in the monitor's 
ability to initiate the processes necessary to reinitiate 
mental control in accordance with Wegner's (1994) 
theory—but only when that control is deliberately 
initiated. Intentionality is the key. Wegner (1994) 
himself stresses this fact as well, going so far as to say 
that the effects of the ironic process theory will not 
even apply in cases where there is no intention to 
control. 
It can be argued, however, that mental load does 
not unequivocally inhibit suppression. A clear 
distinction must be made regarding the conditions under 
which mental load is used in order to understand why. If 
load is used in cases where willful mind control is the 
goal, suppression will certainly fail. If load is 
considered to be an experience in which one 
spontaneously interacts with a challenging aspect of the  
environment, then suppression is most likely to 
succeed. Participants in all three experiments were 
asked to suppress target thoughts while under cognitive 
load, but in each condition, emphasis was placed on 
task involvement rather than attempts at suppression. 
Under these experiential conditions of mental load, any 
type of willful mind control processes are bypassed, 
causing suppression to be a consequence rather than a 
goal. 
Absorption: Relevant or Irrelevant? 
The role of absorption still remains unclear. 
Tentative predictions that high absorbers should be able 
to suppress more easily than low absorbers have been 
sustained here in only one experiment. Mention has 
already been made of the controversial merit of the TAS 
as a psychometrically valid instrument. But it is 
possible that dispositional and situational differences 
may influence the outcome of the interactions as well. 
Very little research has been done concerning the 
stimulus situations necessary for absorption to occur 
(Roche & McConkey, 1990). 
Perhaps some questions that should be addressed 
regarding this characteristic are ones of individual 
differences, cause and effect, and selective stimulus 
suitably. Clearly, results indicate that both high- and 
low- absorbers demonstrated the ability to suppress 
successfully when given the proper cognitive demand 
(Experiments 1 and 3). Should a high-absorber be 
capable of becoming engrossed in every situation? 
Must the situation be such that it offers the precise 
conditions under which a high-absorber can become 
sufficiently absorbed? Or could there be an interaction 
of the participant's preferred mental set (instrument or 
experiential) and the demand of the situation? Future 
research should address these issues. 
Conclusion 
This study examined three correlates of thought 
suppression: Attention, absorption, and cognitive load. 
We have provided preliminary evidence that cognitive 
load does promote successful thought suppression if it 
is used as an experiential thought distracter and if it 
involuntarily occupies attentional resources at an 
appropriate level of challenging involvement. In order 
to investigate the validity of this claim, it may be 
beneficial to direct future research toward the 
examination of the strength of target thoughts as well 
as cognitive load. Target thoughts in this study 
consisted of mentions of specific words that were to be 
suppressed or expressed. Working under the assumption 
that mere mentions of target thought would not prime a 
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participant's consciousness sufficiently to make 
suppression difficult, it would be interesting to see 
what effect actual images of target words would have on 
the ability to suppress under cognitive load (S. 
Zaremba, personal communication, February 24, 
1995). In addition, according to Palmer's study (as cited 
in Best, 1992), since attentional resources diminish 
proportionately as the number of stimuli are increased, 
varying the set size of each condition of cognitive load 
may play a role in impairing the ability to achieve 
successful thought suppression, even on an involuntary 
basis. 
Clinical applications of these findings may help 
people obtain some relief from troublesome or 
recurring thoughts. Certainly implementation of the 
flow experience is not being proposed as a viable 
treatment for forms psychopathology. But for day-to-
day occurrences of unwanted thoughts, becoming 
engrossed in an enjoyable or challenging activity may 
provide a short term respite. By recognizing times 
when states of altered consciousness occur, those 
particular circumstances can be deliberately sought out 
and used for distraction from bothersome or even 
obsessive thoughts or feelings. It is not yet known, 
however, just how long or well this method will work. 
It may be a matter of subjective motivation and ability. 
Finally, flow experiences could be used simply to make 
life more enjoyable or fulfilling. Finding an inner 
experience that enriches one's life could be quite a 
valuable discovery. 
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